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Article 7

DISCLOSURE OF PRELIMINARY MERGER
NEGOTIATIONS-TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?
DANIEL L. GOELZER*

Must a publicly-traded company disclose that it is involved in
confidential merger negotiations when those negotiations have not
yet resulted (and may never result) in a definitive agreement as to
the price and structure of the transaction? When, if ever, may a
public company engaged in such preliminary negotiations issue a
statement falsely denying their existence? If the insiders of a negotiating company purchase the acquiree company's stock-stock sure
to increase in value if a nascent merger comes to fruition-without
informing the selling shareholders, do the purchasers violate the
prohibitions against insider trading?
The answers to these questions depend in part on whether preliminary merger negotiations are deemed material within the meaning of Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. False
statements concerning publicly-traded securities, or failures to state
information, are actionable under rule lOb-5 only if the misstated or
omitted fact is material. At first blush, the materiality of a possible
merger would seem beyond cavil. As one court has recently observed: "[O]nly an addlepated investor would consider... unimportant in" making investment decisions the difference between the
current market value and the price at which a potential merger is
likely to be consummated.' Nonetheless, the federal courts of appeals that have considered the question have reached conflicting results. The Third and Seventh Circuits have held that such
negotiations are immaterial as a matter of law, unless and until the
negotiating parties actually agree on the price and structure of a
merger. The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, has rejected the price and
structure rule. The Second Circuit, while paying some lip service to
the rule, has not squarely addressed it.
* General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1969; J.D., University of Wisconsin School of Law, 1973; LL.M., National Law
Center, George Washington University, 1979. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. Views expressed herein are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the
staff of the Commission.
1. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987).

974

1987]

DISCLOSURE-TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?

975

The Securities and Exchange Commission, not surprisingly, has
taken the position that all statements by issuers and acquirors must
be materially accurate and complete. The Commission has made
clear that false public statements denying that merger negotiations
are pending can violate rule lOb-5. In the Commission's view, statements concerning preliminary merger negotiations must be analyzed within the same framework as statements concerning any
other corporate development. Thus, the Commission has rejected
the price and structure rule. Rather, the Commission has stated that
the materiality of merger negotiations depends on a balancing of
the likelihood that the negotiations will ripen into a transaction and
the magnitude2 of the merger (i.e., its importance to shareholders) if
it does occur.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in order to resolve
these conflicting views. 3 This article examines the background
against which the Court will resolve this fundamental issue.4
I.

DUTY

TO DISCLOSE MERGER NEGOTIATIONS

The question of whether a particular fact must be disclosed
under rule lOb-5 requires the analysis of two distinct issues. First, is
there a duty to disclose the fact, and second, is the fact material?
Much of the confusion in the case law stems from the failure of the
courts to distinguish between these inquiries. As a result, some
courts seem to have implicitly assumed that if otherwise confidential
merger negotiations are material, they must be disclosed to the public. The assumption that all material negotiations must necessarily
be disclosed has led these courts to formulate narrow tests of materiality. In fact, there is no general duty to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations. Although there are some exceptions, a public
2. See, e.g., In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985) [hereinafter Carnation release].
3. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284
(1987).
4. The materiality of preliminary merger negotiations has been the subject of considerable recent commentary. See, e.g., Brodsky, Disclosure of Merger Negotiations, N.Y.LJ.,
Nov. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Brown, Corporate Conmunicationsand the FederalSecurities Lawys, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 782-92 (1985); Goldstein, Donnelly & Wurczinger, Disclosure of
a Potential Change in Corporate Control, 19 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133 (1986);
Greene, Public Disclosureof Merger Negotiations, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 24, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Posner,
Surprise! The SEC Says You Shouldn 't Tell Lies About Alerger Negotiations, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Aug. 26, 1985, at 36; Olson, Revealing Aerger Talks: WT'hen, Hown are Critical,
Legal Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at 11, col. 1. See also Note, Disclosure of PreliminaryMeger
Negotiations Under Rule lOb-5, 62 WASH. L. REV. 81 (1987).
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company is generally entitled to maintain confidentiality, even if the
negotiations are material.
There are, however, important exceptions to this corporate
right to remain silent. These exceptions, in which a public company
is obligated to disclose ongoing, confidential merger negotiations,
are derived from three sources: rule lOb-5 itself; specific Commission "line item" disclosure requirements; 5 and stock exchange or
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) listing standards.
Since the question of whether merger negotiations are material is
moot absent a duty to disclose them, it is useful to review the outlines of these duties before examining the question of materiality.
A. Rule lOb-5
Rule lOb-5 is a general prohibition against fraud and the misstatement or omission of material facts in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities. 6 Rule lOb-5 does not, by its terms,
require the disclosure of any particular information, nor does it refer to preliminary merger negotiations. Rule lOb-5 may, however,
compel a public company 7 to make disclosure of material facts concerning preliminary merger negotiations in three situations: when
the issuing company trades in its own stock; when prior public statements concerning the company have become misleading; and when
the corporation chooses to speak voluntarily.
1. Issuer "Insider" Trading.-Rule lOb-5 precludes anyone, including the issuing company, from purchasing or selling a security
while in possession of material, nonpublic information concerning
5. "Line item" refers to Commission rules directing that certain information be
disclosed in public documents filed with the Commission. In some cases, line item requirements are qualified by a materiality standard-responsive information need only be
disclosed if material. In other cases, responsive information must be disclosed regardless of materiality.
6. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
7. Rule 1Ob-5 encompasses any purchase or sale of securities, regardless of whether
the issuer of the security is publicly or closely held. See infra note 74.
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the security, if the trader is under a duty not to use the information. 8
Determining precisely what duties are encompassed within rule lOb5 has been a central issue in the law of insider trading. 9 It is wellsettled, however, that the issuing company itself owes a fiduciary
duty not to use corporate information to profit at the expense of its
own shareholders. Thus, the issuer may not trade in its own shares
while in possession of material, nonpublic information.' Accordingly, if ongoing preliminary merger negotiations are material, the
company must either refrain from trading in its securities or make
disclosure of the negotiations. On the other hand, if the merger
negotiations are not material, the company (at least as a matter of
rule lOb-5 law) may presumably purchase its own shares from investors, even though the company is aware of the possibility that the
inchoate merger will dramatically increase the value of those shares.
2. Corrections and Updates of Prior Corporate Statements.-Rule
lOb-5 has also been held to create a requirement that publiclytraded companies correct prior public statements that have become
inaccurate or misleading. "It is now clear that there is a duty to
correct or revise a prior statement which was accurate when made
but which has become misleading due to subsequent events.""l l
Moreover, the company may also be obligated to correct statements
by third parties or even rumors 12 which are attributable to the
company. 13
8. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted,
107 S.Ct. 666 (1986) (trading in breach of newspaper's policy prohibiting employee use
of information gathered in the course of journalistic endeavors); SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (trading in breach of financial
printer's policy prohibiting employees from using information entrusted to employer by
customers); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (trading in breach
of expectation of confidentiality between father and son).
10. SeeJordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d
414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v.
Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 654 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1981).
11. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other gronnds,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). See also Greenfield v.
Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (fraud within rule lOb5 includes "a failure to correct a misleading impression left by a statement already made
. . . .").

12. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d at 850 (holding that
company has no duty to correct or verify rumors unless attributable to it).
13. Compare Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) (hold-

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:974

This duty, however, is not unlimited. It exists only while the
prior statement "remains alive" in the sense that investors are relying on its accuracy and is, therefore, influencing the trading market
for that security. Once the statement can no longer reasonably be
viewed as operative, correction is no longer required. 14 Thus, if a
company has issued a public statement denying the existence of
merger negotiations, and merger negotiations later commence, it
may be obligated to disclose those negotiations, if the denial is still
"alive" in the market and if the negotiations are material.
3. Voluntary Corporate Statements.-Three of the leading decisions concerning the materiality of merger negotiations-Levinson,
Heublein and Carnation-involve voluntary corporate statements.
Rule 1Ob-5 requires that if a corporation chooses to speak voluntarily, its statements must be truthful and complete in all material respects." This prohibition is triggered whenever the issuer speaks,
regardless of whether the issuer is trading in its own securities or is
otherwise required to disclose material facts:
The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure
to the integrity of the securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot rely upon
the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they
will be less likely to invest, thereby reducing the liquidity of
the securities markets to the detriment of investors and issuers alike. 6
Thus, while the securities laws do not obligate companies to issue
public statements concerning merger negotiations, a company that
chooses to speak cannot make a materially false or materially misleading statement about ongoing negotiations.
ing that issuer may be so deeply involved in preparation of outsider's projections that it
"assume[d] a duty to correct material errors in those projections") with Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding no
duty to correct statement not attributable to issuer). See also Green v. Jankop, 358 F.
Supp. 413, 418-19 (D. Or. 1973) (holding company obligated to correct statements issued by its investment banker).
14. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. at 908 ("[L]ogic compels the conclusion
that time may render statements immaterial and end any duty to correct or revise
them."). See also Warner Communications v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1489-90 n.13
(D. Del. 1984) (doubt as to whether misrepresentation in 1975 proxy statement has a
continuing materiality to unrelated securities transactions in 1983).
15. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp.
128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
16. Carnation release, supra note 2, at 87,595.
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"Line Item" Requirements

Several Commission rules create specific line item disclosure
requirements that may, in some cases, compel disclosure of otherwise nonpublic preliminary merger negotiations. For example, Securities Act rule 40817 and Securities Exchange Act rule 12b-20 8
respectively require that, in any registration statement filed under
the Securities Act of 1933 and in any statement or report filed under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a company must include such
information as is "necessary to make the required statements, in
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading."' 9
In addition, item 4 of schedule 13D may compel the other party
to the merger negotiations to make disclosure. Section 13(d)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act 20 requires that, within ten days of acquiring more than five percent of a class of securities of a publiclytraded company, the acquiring person must file a schedule 13D with
the Commission. Item 4 of schedule 13D requires a description of
any "plans or proposals" of the acquiring person that would result
in any of ten specified corporate events. 2 ' When the five percent
holder is negotiating a merger with the company, item 4 may require disclosure of those negotiations. And, even when no such negotiations are ongoing at the time of the initial schedule 13D filing,
a "prompt ' ' 22 amendment to disclose any change in the content of
schedule 13D, including the change in the item 4 information, must
17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1986).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1986).
19. Id. A registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 is filed when the
company contemplates a public offering of its securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
Thus, whether or not disclosure of pending preliminary merger negotiations would be
required under rule 408, rule 1Ob-5 presumably requires such disclosure, if the negotia-

tions are material. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, publicly-traded companies are required to file annual reports on form 10-K, quarterly reports on form 10-Q
and reports on form 8-K when certain significant events occur. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
Rule 12b-20 would require the disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations whenever
such disclosure is necessary to make the content of these filings not misleading.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982).
21. These events include an "extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger,
17
reorganization, or liquidation, involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries ....
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, item 4.
22. The Commission has stated that "promptness" must be determined on a caseby-case basis. See In the Matter of Cooper Laboratories, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
22,171, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,788, at 87,526 (July
3, 1985). In Cooper the Commission found that in the case of a schedule 13D indicating
the possibility of further acquisitions of the issuer's shares, an amendment filed after the
acquiror had, in fact, sold all of its holdings, and seven days after the beginning of the
liquidation process, was not prompt.
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be filed.2"
Finally, the Commission disclosure requirement in item 7(a) of
schedule 14D-9 refers specifically to merger negotiations.1 4 Schedule 14D-9 must be filed by an issuer making a recommendation to
its shareholders with respect to another person's tender offer for the
issuer's securities. 2 5 Item 7(a) of schedule 14D-9 requires the target
company to state whether it is engaging in any negotiations in response to the bidder's tender offer that would result in, among
other things, an "extraordinary transaction such as a merger or reorganization .. .. ""6 Item 7(b), in contrast, requires the issuer to
describe any "agreement in principle" that would result in, among
other things, such a merger. In the release announcing the adoption of rule 14d-9, the Commission stated that "the major developments referred to in item 7 can be one of the most material items of
information received by security holders. '"27
The instructions to item 7(a) recognize that negotiations do occur prior to an agreement in principle. Accordingly, a target company need not disclose "the possible terms of any transactions or
the parties thereto ... if in the opinion of the Board of Directors of
the subject company such a disclosure would jeopardize continuation of such negotiations." 2 8 In those circumstances "disclosure
that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in
29
the preliminary stages will be sufficient."
The Commission recently issued an opinion, In the Matter of
Revlon, Inc.,3" setting forth the circumstances under which item 7(a)
requires disclosure of negotiations. Revlon was engaged in negotia23. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1982).
24. For other examples of references to merger negotiations, see the disclosure requirements in item 3(b) of schedule 14D-5, item 504 of regulation S-K, instruction 6,
and item 3(b) of schedule 13E-3.
25. Securities Exchange Act § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982), authorizes the
Commission to regulate recommendations to accept or reject a tender offer. Rule 14e2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1986), requires the target company to inform its shareholders
whether or not it recommends (or takes no position on) acceptance of the bidder's offer.
Rule 14d-9 requires that recommendations for or against acceptance of a tender offer be
filed on schedule 14D-9. The requirements of schedule 14D-9 are set forth in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-101.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, item 7(a) (1986).
27. Tender Offers, Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,594 (Nov. 29, 1979). See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-9.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, item 7, instructions (1986).
29. Id.
30. Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,006 (June 16, 1986).
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tions to sell part of its business as a counter-maneuver to fend off a
pending tender offer by Pantry Pride. In its schedule 14D-9 Revlon
stated that its Board of Directors had rejected Pantry Pride's offer as
inadequate and had adopted certain defensive measures. In response to item 7(a) Revlon stated that it "may undertake negotiations which relate to or could result in" any of the various
extraordinary corporate events specified in item 7(a), but that
"[c]urrently, however, no negotiations have been undertaken with
third parties."''1 Although Revlon subsequently modified this statement, the company did not disclose that it was actually engaged in
negotiations until the day before the friendly merger agreement and
asset sales were announced.
In its order the Commission concluded that the discussions
leading up to this agreement constituted negotiations required to be
disclosed under item 7(a):
The term "negotiations" should not be interpreted in a
technical and restrictive manner. See Levinson v. Basic Inc.,
786 F. 2d 741, 747 (6th Cir. 1986). As used in item 7(a),
the term "negotiations" includes not only final price bargaining, but also applies to substantive discussions between the parties or their legal 32and financial advisers
concerning a possible transaction.
Discussions constituted "negotiations" by the time that the following events had occurred:
[T]he parties had established contact, had begun and concluded their initial reviews of confidential financial information, had retained counsel to discuss between and
among themselves the structure and timing of the acquisitions, and had discussed the percentage of equity to be offered to . . .the Revlon management group.... [An offer
had been presented] which, although rejected, became the
basis upon which the parties negotiated, including discussions . . . over the structure of the ... [transactions]. 33
The Commission concluded that Revlon's schedule 14D-9 statement that Revlon "may undertake" negotiations inaccurately implied that no negotiations were underway.
The obligation to disclose preliminary merger negotiations pur31. 35 SEC Docket at 1543. In addition, as authorized under the item 7(a) instructions, Revlon stated that it would not disclose the parties or possible terms of any transaction until an agreement in principle was reached. Id. at 1543-44.
32. Id.at 1551.
33. Id.
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suant to item 7(a) is absolute in the sense that no separate duty to
disclose is necessary; item 7(a), when it applies, creates a disclosure
obligation, even though the instruction to the item permits the disclosure to be quite general. Materiality is not an issue. If "negotiations" are occurring as defined in Revlon, disclosure must be made.
In contrast, as discussed above, disclosure of preliminary merger
negotiations is not required under rule lOb-5, unless there is issuer
trading, a duty to correct, or a voluntary statement. But, when rule
lOb-5 requires disclosure, it must be detailed enough to ensure that
investors are not misled.
The only appellate decision to consider the relationship between item 7 (a) of schedule 14D-9 and rule lOb-5 fails to clearly
recognize the distinction between them. In Starkman v. Marathon Oil
Co.3 4 the court, recognizing that Marathon was not required to disclose the specifics of preliminary negotiations in response to item
7(a), held that the negotiations also need not be disclosed under
rule lOb-5. Marathon was the object of an unfriendly tender offer
commenced by Mobil Oil. In a press release and letter to shareholders, Marathon stated that "we are determined to stay independent" and that "shareholders would be well served if Marathon
remains independent." 3 5 Nonetheless, in response to item 7(a),
Marathon stated that it was investigating various transactions, including "a business combination between the company and another
company,"36-an event that would, of course, have put an end to
Marathon's independence. Subsequently, U.S. Steel commenced a
friendly tender offer for Marathon Oil and eventually acquired
control.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that Marathon's public
statements concerning its desire to "stay independent" were false
and misleading under rule lOb-5 in light of its negotiations with
U.S. Steel. The court explained:
The SEC and the courts have enunciated a firm rule regarding a tender offer target's duty to disclose ongoing negotiations: so long as merger or acquisition discussions are
preliminary, general disclosure of the fact that such alternatives are being considered will suffice to adequately inform shareholders; a duty to disclose the possible terms of
any transaction and the parties thereto arises only after
agreement in principle, regarding such fundamental terms
34. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
35. Id. at 235-36.
36. Id. at 236.
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as price and structure, has been reached.3 7
The court, referring to the instruction to item 7(a) that authorizes the target to refrain from detailed disclosure of negotiations,
stated that the Commission had a "longstanding policy that negotiations need not otherwise be disclosed unless an agreement in principle has been reached. 3 8
The difficulty with the Starkman opinion is that it confuses the
limitation in item 7(a) on the disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations with the obligation under rule lOb-5 to refrain from making
materially incomplete or misleading public statements. It may be,
under the circumstances in Starkman, that Marathon's public disclosure did not violate rule 14d-9, especially since the schedule 14D-9
was disseminated to shareholders along with the shareholder letter
asserting the desire to remain independent. But if the ongoing preliminary merger negotiations were material, and if Marathon's public statements can be interpreted as denying their existence, then
rule lOb-5 would require disclosure of the negotiations, despite the
fact that rule 14d-9 compels only a general statement concerning
them.
C. Exchange Listing Requirements
Another source of a public company's obligation to disclose
preliminary merger negotiations is the listing standards of the stock
exchanges on which the company's securities are traded. For example, the New York Stock Exchange imposes a general duty to
promptly disclose material information. The stock exchange manual states that "a listed company is expected to release quickly to the
public any news or information which might reasonably be expected
to materially affect the market for its securities."3 9 The rules of the
American Stock Exchange contain a similar requirement: "The Exchange considers the conduct of a fair and orderly market requires
every listed company to make available the public information necessary for informed investing; and to take reasonable steps to ensure that all who invest in its securities enjoy equal access to such
information. 40
The legal force of these listing requirements is open to some
37. Id. at 243.
38. Id. at 243 n.9.
39. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company 11anual § 202.05 (1986).
40. American Stock Exchange Company Guide § 401 (1983). See also Boston Stock Exchange, Rules of the Board of Governors, Supplement to Chapter XXVII CCH BSE Guide
(2265 and 2258); Midwest Stock Exchange Rules, Policy on Informing the Public, Article
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question. First, the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange requirements expressly recognize that there may be
valid business reasons for not disclosing information-an exception
which an issuer would presumably wish to invoke with respect to
preliminary merger negotiations. The New York Stock Exchange Listed
Company Manual states:
Negotiations leading to mergers and acquisitions . . . are
the type of developments where the risk of untimely and
inadvertent disclosure of corporate plans are most likely to
occur....

Accordingly, extreme care must be used in or-

der to keep the information on a confidential basis. Where
it is possible to confine formal or informal discussions to a
small group of the top management of the company or
companies involved, and their individual confidential advisers where adequate security can be maintained, premature
public announcement may properly be avoided.4
The American Stock Exchange recognizes a similar qualification on
the obligation to make disclosure.4 2
Second, it is unsettled whether a private party could enforce
these requirements. The federal courts are split over whether an
implied right of action exists against a listed issuer for failure to
comply with exchange or NASD listing requirements. The greater
weight of authority rejects such a cause of action. 4" As a practical
matter, the chief sanction is the threat that the exchange will delist
the company's shares if it fails to comply with its obligations as a
listed company. Such a sanction is infrequently invoked and, in any
event, it may be of scant concern to a company contemplating a
merger which will itself result in its delisting.
Nonetheless, exchange inquiries concerning the reasons for unXXVIII Rule 7, Interpretation .01, CCH MSE Guide Para. 1898 at 2133; NationalAssociation of Securities Dealer's Manual, Schedule D, Part II Section (B)(3)(b).
41. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 202.01 (1986).
42. American Stock Exchange Company Guide § 402 (1985).
43. Compare Van Germert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1380 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 947 (1975) (implied right of action exists) with Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
614 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action exists for violation by
broker of NASD "suitability" rule). See also State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1981) (no implied private right of action for violation of NYSE disclosure requirements); Margaret Hall Found., Inc. v. Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,514, at
96,972 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 1983); Chapman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,419, at 96,408 (D. Md.
July 19, 1983) ("even where fraud is alleged, an implied private right of action does not
exist under the rules of the NYSE and the NASD").
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usual activity in a company's stock frequently trigger corporate
statements denying the existence of ongoing merger negotiations.
Thus, while silence concerning preliminary merger negotiations is
legally an option and, in most cases, the most attractive alternative
for the negotiating company, stock exchange disclosure requirements, and the resulting inquiries from exchange officials, may make
complete silence infeasible.
II.

MATERIALITY OF PRELIMINARY MERGER NEGOTIATIONS

Even if some duty to disclose applies, rule lOb-5 requires disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations only if information concerning them is material. The federal appellate courts are divided
over when, if ever, negotiations that have not ripened into agreement are considered material.
The Supreme Court has previously defined the term "material"
in the context of the proxy solicitation provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc." the Court
stated that information about a corporation will be considered material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." This standard contemplates a "showing of a substantial likelihood that . . .
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. ' 45 Although TSC Industries
arose under rule 14a-9, the federal courts of appeals have subsequently applied the test to cases arising under rule 1Ob-5. 4 6
Difficulty has arisen, however, in applying this test to contingent, future corporate events such as possible mergers. When a
corporate development is certain, its significance to investors depends purely on its importance to the company's fortunes. However, when an event is not certain to occur, as in the case of a
potential merger that is the subject of unresolved negotiations, a
more complex analysis is necessary. The Commission has advocated the probability/magnitude test.47 Under that approach, the
materiality of a future event "will depend at any given time upon a
44. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
45. Id. at 449.
46. See, e.g., McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 466 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
47. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8-9,
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (U.S. filed Apr. 1987); Brief for the Securities and
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10, Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th
Cir. 1986).
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balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
[corporate] . . . activity. '"48

Two courts of appeals, however, have

rejected this test in favor of a "bright-line" test: preliminary negotiations are, as a matter of law, never material until an agreement is
reached on price and structure.4 9 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has
adopted a more subjective standard: preliminary merger negotiations are ipso facto material if the company chooses to issue a public
statement concerning them.5 °
A.

The Bright-Line Test

1. Staffin v. Greenberg and Reiss v. Pan American-Duty or Materiality?-The courts that have held that preliminary merger negotiations are per se immaterial trace their reasoning to the Third
Circuit's 1982 opinion in Staffin v. Greenberg5 ' and the Second Circuit's decision the following year, in Reiss v. Pan American World Airways. 5 ' Both of these opinions concluded that the defendant
companies had not violated rule lOb-5 in failing to disclose the
existence of preliminary merger negotiations. It appears, however,
that in both cases the company was not under a duty to make such
disclosure. There was no duty under rule lOb-5 in either case because neither company was trading in its own stock or had made any
inaccurate public statements. In addition, neither company was
under a duty to disclose the negotiations in a Commission filing.
Thus, while the results in these two cases are correct, their reasoning is overbroad because they unnecessarily addressed the materiality issue.
In Staffin former shareholders brought suit against Bluebird,
Inc., alleging that Bluebird should have disclosed that it was engaged in merger negotiations that ultimately led to the company's
acquisition at a premium over market price. The plaintiffs sold their
shares after Bluebird's initial contacts with its acquiror, but before
Bluebird made a public announcement that "exploratory talks"
48. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Accord SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983);
SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1054-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980).
49. Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (3d Cir. 1982); Reiss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983).
50. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1204
(1987).
51. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
52. 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
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were in progress. The announcement came as a response to the
unusual activity in the market for Bluebird stock.
The Third Circuit held that no disclosure of the initial merger
contacts was necessary because preliminary merger discussions are
"immaterial as a matter of law."" 3 The rationale for this holding
was that disclosure of such negotiations "may itself be misleading."5 4 The court reasoned that "[t]hose persons who would buy
stock on the basis of the occurrence of preliminary merger discussions preceding a merger which never occurs are left 'holding the
bag' on a stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate
hope." 5 5 Thus, in order to avoid the risk of unrealistically exciting
the expectations of shareholders that a merger will occur, the Third
Circuit concluded that a per se rule that preliminary merger negotiations are immaterial, and thus need not be disclosed, was
preferable.
In Reiss former convertible debenture holders sued Pan American for its failure to disclose its efforts to acquire National Airlines.
The plaintiffs had sold their shares after Pan American announced
that the debentures would be called. Shortly thereafter, Pan American announced its merger with National. Although typically the primary market impact of a merger announcement is on the stock of
the target rather than that of the acquiror, in this case Pan American's stock rose in value following the merger announcement. Since
the plaintiff's debentures were convertible into common stock, the
debentures also rose in value.
Relying on Staffin the Second Circuit held that information concerning the National/Pan American merger negotiations was not
material at the time of the debenture-call press release:
It does not serve the underlying purposes of the securities
acts to compel disclosure of merger negotiations in the not
unusual circumstances before us. ...
Such negotiations are
inherently fluid and the eventual outcome is shrouded in

uncertainty. Disclosure may in fact be more misleading
than secrecy so far as investment decisions are
concerned.56
The Second Circuit also held that Pan American lacked scienter, an intent to deceive or defraud, which is a necessary element of
53.
54.
55.
56.

672 F.2d at 1206.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
711 F.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
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private damage actions under rule 1Ob-5. 7 The court reasoned that
Pan American's own natural interest would be to encourage conversion, rather than redemption pursuant to the call. Redemption required the company to distribute cash to the former debenture
holders; conversion, by contrast, did not require a cash expenditure.
Announcement of the pending merger negotiations would presumably have driven up the price of Pan American's stock, thus encouraging conversions. Accordingly, since the failure to disclose the
negotiations was contrary to Pan American's interest, the court concluded that Pan American had not acted with scienter: "Pan Am had
every reason to disclose information which would have increased
the trading price of its common stock, for the higher the stock price,
the greater the incentive for debentureholders to convert."'5 8
Although Reiss and Stafin reached the correct result, in both
cases the corporations involved were not under any duty to make
statements concerning their pending merger negotiations and,
therefore, the complete silence of both corporations was lawful. Indeed, in Stafin Bluebird promptly issued a press release accurately
describing its negotiations when market activity in its stock suggested a leak concerning the possible merger. 9 In Reiss Pan American was silent concerning merger negotiations. Unlike Bluebird,
Pan American was in the process of purchasing its own securitiesby calling its debentures. But, as the court noted, Pan American's
failure to make disclosure concerning the merger negotiations in the
context of a call announcement can hardly be viewed as fraud under
rule lOb-5, because the failure to make disclosure was, if anything,
contrary to Pan American's interest.6"

57. Id. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-201 (1976).
58. 711 F.2d at 14.
59. 672 F.2d at 1201. Bluebird was under a disclosure obligation during a period
prior to any serious merger activity, when it had made an issuer tender offer to acquire
its own securities. But all that occurred during that period was an initial contact. Standing alone, this is not material information triggering the issuer's disclosure obligations
that flow from its role as a purchaser of its own securities. Id. at 1205-07. An unsolicited
inquiry concerning merger possibilities is not in itself material. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir. 1976).
60. Significantly, the lower courts in the Second Circuit have not read Reiss as adopting the price and structure test and have continued to hold that preliminary merger
discussions can be material. In Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court characterized Reiss "as a case involving an omission,
under circumstances where there was no duty to disclose inchoate merger plans." See
also SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,004
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that when takeover negotiations proceed substantially beyond
the exploratory stage, information about the negotiations is material).
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2. Greenfield v. Heublein-The extension of the Price and Structure test
to Voluntary Corporate Statements.-In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.6 ' the
Third Circuit extended the reasoning in Staffin to a case in which a
company voluntarily issued a press release, thus placing the company under an affirmative duty to make materially accurate statements concerning preliminary merger negotiations. The impact of
Heublein is clouded by two facts: first, the court seems to assume
that if the merger negotiations were material, Heublein was obligated to disclose them, regardless of its voluntary statement; second, the court squarely holds, over a strong dissent by the author of
Staffin, that the corporation had not made a false statement when it
denied any knowledge of the reasons for unusual stock activity,
notwithstanding the fact that preliminary merger negotiations were
pending.
Heublein was the object of unwanted takeover interest by General Cinema Corporation. On July 14, 1982, General Cinema informed Heublein that it was taking steps to raise cash, presumably
to finance purchases of Heublein stock. That same day trading activity in Heublein's shares increased dramatically. In response to an
inquiry from the New York Stock Exchange, Heublein issued a statement saying that it was "aware of no reason that would explain the
activity in its stock in trading on the NYSE today." '6 2 Meanwhile,
Heublein stepped up efforts to negotiate a friendly merger with a
"white knight," R.J. Reynolds. On July 29 Heublein announced a
merger with R.J. Reynolds at $60 per share.
Greenfield, a Heublein shareholder, had sold his stock on July
27 at $45.25. Greenfield brought suit against Heublein, alleging
that the issuance of the July 14 statement, and the failure to update
it prior to July 29, violated rule lOb-5. In essence, his argument was
that Heublein's July 14 statement that it was not aware of any reason
that would explain the activity in its stock was either false when
made, because Heublein had discussed merging with both General
Cinema and R.J. Reynolds, or that the statement was still "alive" in
the market, became false, and should have been corrected.
The Third Circuit conducted a two-step analysis in rejecting
Greenfield's claim. First, relying on Staffin, it held that "because disclosure of such tentative discussions may itself be misleading to
shareholders, preliminary merger discussions are immaterial as a

61. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
62. Id. at 754.
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matter of law."-6 3 Further, the court concluded that merger discussions are preliminary and thus immaterial until there is an agreement on the price and structure of an actual merger:
Agreement as to price and structure provides concrete evidence of a mature understanding between the negotiating
corporations. They constitute a usable and definite measure for determining when disclosures need be made. Finally, with both price and structure agreed to, there is only
a minimal chance that a public announcement would quash
the deal or that the investing
public would be misled as to
64
likely corporate activity.
Since there was no agreement as to price and structure with R.J.
Reynolds until sometime after Greenfield sold his shares, and since
there was never an agreement with General Cinema, the court held
that Greenfield could not recover for the failure to disclose either
set of negotiations.
The Third Circuit next considered the question of whether the
July 14 statement was false and concluded that it was not. Although
Heublein executives "clearly knew of information that might have
accounted for the increase in trading, there is no indication that any
of this privileged information had been leaked or that they knew of,
or had, information that insiders were engaged in trading." 6 5 Accordingly, in the court's view, the statement that Heublein was
"aware of no reason" for unusual activity in its stock was literally
true-Heublein was not aware of a leak, and, therefore, it was not
aware of any reason for unusual activity in its stock. Judge Higginbotham vigorously dissented from this portion of the opinion,
stating:
The majority seems determined to rest its entire case on
the belief that corporate executives should be able to suggest that all is proceeding at a routine, business-as-usual
pace when that is not the truth so long as an agreement in
principle has not been reached at the time the statement
was issued. Given the majority's concession that in this
case Heublein knew of information that might have accounted for the increase in the trading of Heublein's stock
and given the possibility that information could have been
leaked to or ascertained by some investors, the statement
by Heublein that it was aware of no reason to explain the
63. Id. at 756.
64. Id. at 757.
65. Id. at 759.
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increase in trading of its stock was false or misleading or so
incomplete as to mislead.6 6
The majority's conclusion that Heublein's July 14 statement
was not misleading is difficult to accept; in this regard, Judge Higginbotham's dissent is persuasive. Indeed, the Commission has indicated that it disagrees with the decision in Heublein.6 7 However, if
the holding that the July 14 statement was not misleading is accepted, then the court's analysis of the materiality of Heublein's
merger negotiations with General Cinema and R.J. Reynolds is unnecessary to its decision. If the July 14 statement was not inaccurate, Heublein was under no duty to disclose its negotiations,
regardless of their materiality.
3. Flamm v. Eberstadt-Seventh Circuit Adoption of the Price and
Structure Test.-The Seventh Circuit recently adopted the price and
structure test in a case that would also seem to be better analyzed on
the basis of the absence of any duty to make disclosure. In Flamm v.
Eberstadt6 s Microdot was the object of a hostile tender offer by General Cable. Microdot issued a statement asserting that it would
"employ all resources at our disposal to defeat the offer." 6 9
Microdot also published an advertisement deploring the fact that
successful growth companies were habitually the targets of tender
offers. At the same time, however, Microdot began to seek a "white
knight" and eventually consummated a merger with Northwest Industries. Flamm, a Microdot shareholder, sold his shares after
Microdot announced its resolve to defeat the General Cable offer,
but before the merger with Northwest Industries was announced.
Flamm brought suit against Microdot alleging that the nonpublic
negotiations leading up to the Northwest offer were material information that should have been disclosed pursuant to rule lOb-5.
The court of appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of Microdot,
expressly adopting the price and structure rule. The court cited
Staffin and Reiss for the proposition that "efforts by public corporations to arrange mergers are immaterial ...

as a matter of law, until

the firms have agreed on the 'price and structure' of the deal." 70
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, cited three possible reasons for this conclusion. First, the court found that "disclosure of
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 765.
Carnation release, supra note 2, at 87,576.
814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1174.
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ongoing negotiations may befuddle the investors, leading them to
think that the outcome is more certain than it is." Second, the court
found that premature disclosure may hinder the negotiation of the
merger, "destroying the source of the value sought to be disclosed."
Third, the court acknowledged a "need to create a bright-line rule
that will allow firms to plan corporate transactions with the assurance that they will not be condemned no matter which way they proceed on disclosure." 7 1 While the court rejected the first rationale, it
concluded that the second and the third provide strong support for
the price and structure test. Since, under that test, the Northwest/Microdot merger negotiations were not material, it held that
Microdot was not obligated to disclose them.
The court also considered whether Microdot's voluntary statement that it would seek to defeat General Cable's offer was tantamount to a false denial of the existence of merger negotiations. The
court concluded that this statement cannot be read as such a denial
since a reasonable shareholder would recognize that a merger with a
friendly party is a common means of defeating hostile takeover bids
and that Microdot's publicized concern for the independence of
growth companies did not negate the possibility that it would use
such a tactic. Thus, since Microdot's voluntary statement was not
false, the court did not analyze the circumstances under which false
72
corporate denials of merger negotiations are material.
Like Staffin and Reiss upon which it relied, Flamm could have
been decided without reaching the issue of when preliminary
merger negotiations become material. The court held that
Microdot made no statement at all concerning the pendency of
merger negotiations: "Ours is therefore a case of silence on the
subject of the omitted information." ' 73 Since the company chose to
remain silent, it was therefore under no obligation to disclose its
discussions with Northwest, whether material or not.7 4 Although
71. Id. at 1175.

72. Flamm characterized this as "a difficult question." Id. at 1178. In declining to
consider whether a false denial of the pendency of preliminary merger negotiations is
actionable, Judge Easterbrook stated: "For all practical purposes, Microdot was mum
on its strategy for defeating General Cable's bid .... We therefore affirm the judgment
without choosing between Greenfield and Levinson." Id. at 1179.
73. Id.

74. Subsequent to Flamm, in Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 431 (7th
Cir. 1987), the court reiterated that, under Flamm, merger negotiations would not have
to be disclosed prior to agreement on price and structure in the case of a public company. InJordan this statement is dictum, since that case involves a closely held company.
The Seventh Circuit has previously held that, in the case of a closely held company, the
price and structure test is inapplicable, and information concerning preliminary merger
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not relevant to the court's holding, Judge Easterbrook observed that
the firm's right to remain silent may be illusory:
Suppose a firm is engaged in negotiations that are best
kept quiet, and the Exchange asks whether new developments account for activity in its stock. If the firm says yes
and it says why, the cat is out of the bag; if the firm says no,
it faces liability for fraud; if the firm says "no comment"
that is the same thing as saying "yes" because investors will
deduce the truth.75
B.

Levinson v. Basic: Materiality by Virtue of Misstatement

While the Seventh Circuit has endorsed the Third Circuit's
price and structure test, 76 the Sixth Circuit, in Levinson v. Basic Inc.,
expressly rejected it. Although the rationale for the Levinson holding is not completely clear, the court seems to formulate a test of
materiality that attaches significance to the fact that the corporation
has chosen to speak on a particular subject. In addition, the Sixth
Circuit has sided with Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Heublein and
rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that "no corporate developments" statements are not misleading if management is aware of
developments but has no reason to believe those developments
have leaked to the market.
Levinson, like Heublein, involved voluntary corporate statements
disclaiming knowledge of the reasons for unusual activity in the
company's stock. One statement asserted flatly that no negotiations
were underway with any company for a merger. That statement also
recited, as did two subsequent statements, that management was
"unaware of any present or pending corporate development" that
would account for the recent unusual trading activity in the company's stock. Plaintiffs asserted that these statements were false or
misleading because, in fact, Basic was engaged in merger negotiations with Combustion Engineering. Subsequent to the plaintiffs'
sales of their shares, Basic announced its approval of a tender offer
by Combustion at a price substantially in excess of the market value.
The Sixth Circuit held that when a corporation issues a statement denying the existence of merger negotiations, "information
concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes material by virnegotiations may be material. See Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1195-96 (7th Cir.
1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986).
75. Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1178.
76. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1204 (1987).
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tue of the statement denying their existence."-77 The court distinguished
the voluntary false statement situation from cases, like Stafin, in
which rule lOb-5 liability is predicated on the corporation's remaining silent in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose material
information:
In analyzing whether information regarding merger discussions is material, such that it must be affirmatively disclosed
to avoid a violation of Rule lOb-5, the discussions and their
progress are the primary considerations. However, once a
statement is made denying the existence of any discussions,
even discussions that may not have been material in the absence of the denial are78material because they make the
statement made untrue.
Correspondingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly disagreed with Heublein's holding that merger negotiations are not material until the
parties have agreed on price and structure.7 9
In addition, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that Basic's
statements were not misleading. Implicitly agreeing with the dissent
in Heublein, the Levinson court said that even if Basic's denial of
knowledge of corporate developments accounting for high trading
volume in its stock were literally true, "in that Basic, for some reason, never knew the reason for the unusual market activity," ' 80 they
"could reasonably be read broadly by the public as flat disclaimers
of any significant corporate developments that might account for
the high volume of stock activity."''8 The court also concluded that
Basic's statement that "no negotiations" were occurring was misleading, if not patently untrue, reasoning that:
The average investor does not necessarily know the technical and legal definition of these words as used by Basic. A
statement that 'no negotiations' were occurring could reasonably be read to state that no contacts of any kind whatsoever regarding merger had occurred. 8 2
C.

The Probability/MagnitudeTest-The Position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the posi-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

82. Id.

at
at
at
at

748 (emphasis in original).
749 (footnote omitted).
748-49.
747.
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tion that neither the price and structure rule nor the Levinson test is
the proper basis for determining when preliminary merger negotiations cross the threshold of materiality.8 3 The Third Circuit's test
could, as the Commission has pointed out in urging that certiorari
be granted, permit corporations "freely to issue intentionally false
or misleading statements in denying merger talks that any reasonable investor would consider important to his investment decision,
misleading investors into making investment decisions on the basis
of incorrect information."84 In contrast, the Levinson opinion
equates falsehood and materiality and, thus, "would appear to
render any false statement, regardless of how trivial, per se material."8 " In Levinson the Commission had argued as amicus curiae in
the Sixth Circuit that the proper standard forjudging the materiality
of merger negotiations is the probability/magnitude test articulated
by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 8 6 Under that
test merger negotiations are material if their anticipated magnitude,
balanced against their likely probability, constitutes a fact of which a
reasonable investor would want to be informed.
1. In the Matter of Carnation Co.-The Commission applied
these principles in issuing its report of investigation in In the Matter
of Carnation Co. 87 In July 1984 senior Carnation officials met with
senior officials of Nestle to discuss the possibility of Nestle's acquiring Carnation. Nestle informed Carnation that it would terminate
discussions if Carnation made any public disclosure of Nestle's contacts. On August 7, Carnation's stock price increased $4 5/8 to $66
5/8, and the Dow Jones Newswire carried a story quoting Carnation's treasurer as stating: "There is no news from the company and
no corporate developments that would account for the stock action."'8 8 In fact, the treasurer was not personally aware of the discussions between Carnation and Nestle.
On August 9, when senior officials of the two companies again
met, a possible acquisition price was discussed, but rejected by Car83. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 14-18.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (U.S. filed Apr. 1987).
84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, No.
86-279 (U.S. filed Jan. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
85. Id. at 14.
86. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 6-19,
Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
87. Carnation release, supra note 2. This report, pursuant to section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982), was issued with the consent of Carnation, which neither admitted nor denied any of the allegations therein.
88. Carnation release, supra note 2, at 87,594.
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nation. Further meetings were scheduled for late August. On August 20, Carnation's investment banker informed Carnation's
chairman, at his request, that $90 per share would be a fair price for
Carnation. On August 21, while a meeting between Nestle and Carnation officials was in progress in Switzerland, Carnation's treasurer, still unaware of the existence of the negotiations, again
informed the press that Carnation knew "of no corporate reason for
the recent surge in its stock price."" The newswire story indicated
that:
[H]e had been informed of rumors in the market that Carnation is about to be acquired by Nestle S.A. or be taken
private ....
[B]ut to the best of my knowledge, there is
nothing to substantiate either one of them ....
"We are
not negotiating with anyone.''90
On September 4, 1984, Nestle and Carnation announced an agreement whereby Nestle would acquire Carnation at $83 per share.
In its report the Commission addressed both the issue of the
duty to disclose and the issue of the materiality of preliminary
merger negotiations. With respect to the former, the Commission
stated that publicly-traded companies have a duty under rule lOb-5
to refrain from making public statements that are materially false or
misleading. An issuer who makes a statement while aware of nonpublic information concerning acquisition disclosures "has an obligation to disclose sufficient information concerning the discussions
91
to prevent statements made from being materially misleading."
The Commission added, however, that it:
encourages public companies to respond promptly to market rumors concerning material corporate developments ....
However, an issuer who wants to prevent the
premature disclosure of nonpublic preliminary merger negotiations can, in appropriate circumstances, give a "no
comment" response to press inquiries concerning rumors
92
or unusual market activity.
With regard to the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations, the Commission set forth the fundamental standard articulated by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. :1
"When an issuer makes a public statement, information concerning
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 87,595.
92. Id. at 87,595 n.6.
93. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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preliminary acquisition discussions is material and must be disclosed if the information assumes 'actual significance in the deliberation of' and significantly alters 'the total mix of information
available [to]' the reasonable shareholder."9 4 In this connection,
the Commission noted that: "The Second Circuit has stated that
materiality 'will depend at any given time upon the balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.' "" Applying these principles to the Carnation facts
the Commission found that the August 7 "no corporate developments" statement was materially misleading.
Finally, the Commission addressed the question that had divided the Heublein panel-whether denials of the existence of corporate developments that would influence stock trading were in fact
misleading when the company was unaware of leaks. The Commission found that the August 21 Carnation press release that stated
that the company knew of no corporate reason for the recent surge
in its stock price was materially false and misleading. The Commission recognized that the Third Circuit had held to the contrary on
similar facts and stated simply that the "Commission believes that
Heublein was wrongly decided." 9 6
2. Policy Implications.-It is, perhaps, not surprising that the
Commission took the position in Carnation that a corporation may
not falsely deny the pendency of merger negotiations when pending
negotiations would be significant to a reasonable shareholder. The
notion that public companies may issue false corporate press releases is understandably unattractive to the agency charged with administering and enforcing the full disclosure and antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. In addition, the Commission may be uneasy about the potential relationship between a case
like Carnationand insider trading enforcement. If preliminary negotiations are immaterial from the company's standpoint, the materiality of the same facts from the standpoint of a corporate officer,
investment banker, or other individual privy to the negotiations,
who buys the target company's stock in hopes of turning a quick
profit, might be questioned. Certain of the Commission's insider

94.
95.
1968)
96.

Carnationrelease, supra note 2, at 87,597 (quoting TSC Industies, 426 U.S. at 449).
Id. at n.7 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
Id. at n.8.
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trading cases have involved similar scenarios. 7 If preliminary
merger negotiations are immaterial, then these traders arguably
may act with impunity. That is a conclusion which would undoubtedly trouble the Commission.
At the same time, the Commission has recognized that care
must be used in applying its Carnationholding to other contexts. For
example, the Commission's observation" in Carnationthat the issuer
may respond with "no comment" when confronted with an inquiry
concerning unusual trading volume when confidential merger negotiations are pending may have an unintended perverse effect. In order to avoid the risks of a duty to correct if negotiations do
commence, prudent companies may well respond with "no comment" to all inquiries concerning the reasons for unusual stock market activity, even when no corporate developments such as merger
negotiations are pending. If this occurs, then the effect of the Commission's position is to discourage misleading disclosure at the expense of the dissemination of accurate information to the trading
markets. 99 One member of the Commission has suggested that, in
order to alleviate this problem, the Commission should adopt a safe
harbor rule that would protect companies from the obligation to update truthful denials of merger negotiations, even if negotiations
subsequently commence. 0 0
Similarly, the probability/magnitude test requires care in its application. Since the magnitude of a merger for a small company may
be great, virtually all preliminary negotiations would be considered
material, even if there were a small probability that the deal would
be consummated. In effect, the materiality requirement may be
written out of the law. Of course, as discussed above, it would not
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Siegel, No. 87 Civ. 0963 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 13, 1987), discussed
in Lit. Release No. 11,354, 37 SEC Docket 1276 (Mar. 3, 1987); SEC v. Boesky, No. 86
Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986), discussed in Lit. Release No. 11,288, 37 SEC
Docket 78 (Dec. 2, 1986); SEC v. Katz, No. 86 Civ. 6,008 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 7, 1986),
discussed in Lit. Release No. 11,185, 36 SEC Docket 448 (Aug. 19, 1986); SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1986), discussed in Lit. Release No. 11,095, 35
SEC Docket 1212 (May 27, 1986); SEC v. Thayer, No. CA-3-84-0471-R (N.D. Tex. May
7, 1985), discussed in Lit. Release No. 10,746, 33 SEC Docket 74 (May 21, 1985); SEC v.
Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) .92,004 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
15, 1985).
98. See supra text accompanying note 92.
99. See SEC Forum, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 251, 253-54 (Feb. 21, 1986). For
example, a company may be discouraged from issuing truthful denials of rumored
merger negotiations.
100. See Grundfest, Carnation Revisited: Toward an Optimal Merger Disclosure and Rumor

Response Policy, Address to the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American
Bar Association (Apr. 15, 1986), at 12.

1987]

DISCLOSURE-TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES?

999

follow that there is a duty to disclose all such negotiations; the duty
to disclose and the materiality of the negotiations are separate inquiries. Moreover, as the Commission noted in its Levinson brief,
the potential merger must not be so remote as to preclude a finding
of a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider [the negotiations] important." '
Thus, even potential mergers which would be of tremendous magnitude to a corporation may
not be material at the formative stages, if the probability of occurrence fails to meet this basic threshold.
V.

CONCLUSION

At first blush, the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations seems self-evident. In SEC v. Geon Industries, a case in which
"embryonic" merger talks were held to be material, Judge Friendly
noted that "[a] merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its
death.., even though the mortality rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high."' 0 2 Experience in the Commission's
insider trading enforcement program confirms the dramatic market
effect that information concerning even the possibility of a tender
offer or merger may have. Clearly, the possibility of an acquisition
is often of overwhelming significance to investors.
In contrast, the Third Circuit concluded in Heublein that premature disclosure of merger negotiations may be more damaging to
investors than confidentiality. Expectations of a merger transaction
may inflate the price of the stock, causing purchasers to buy at unjustifiably high prices that inevitably drop if the expected acquisition
fails to materialize. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has found that
since a potential acquiror may insist on confidentiality in order to
avoid driving up the target's price, a rule that forces disclosure of
otherwise nonpublic negotiations may harm more investors than it
protects because it would destroy the chances for a profitable
merger. "Investors seek monetary returns, and few want disclosure
for its own sake. To the extent investors' wealth depends on with'0 3
holding information, all favor that course."'
By granting certiorari in Levinson the Supreme Court has undertaken to resolve the issue of when preliminary merger negotiations
101. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (U.S. filed Apr. 1987) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway,
Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added)).
102. 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987).

1000

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:974

become material." 4 The decision will likely have far-reaching implications. Since materiality is an element in any rule lOb-5 action
based on false, misleading, or incomplete disclosure, the Court's
definition of that term will influence a wide range of cases. In addition, by resolving this issue, the Court may shed needed light on the
interplay between the duty to make disclosure and the materiality of
the information to be disclosed.

104. A second issue before the court in Levinson is whether a plaintiff who trades in a
corporation's stock after issuance of a materially false corporate statement is entitled to
a rebuttable presumption that he relied on the integrity of the market price in so trading. That is, the case presents the issue of whether sellers may establish that a false
corporate statement caused their loss, not by demonstrating that they relied specifically
on the false statement, but on the basis of a presumption that the false statement influenced the market price of the security. The Commission has taken the position that such
a presumption is justified. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 21-27, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, No. 86-279 (U.S. filed Apr. 1987).

